{"id":13927,"date":"2026-03-08T11:34:58","date_gmt":"2026-03-08T14:34:58","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/legalwings.com.br\/?p=13927"},"modified":"2026-04-14T11:44:31","modified_gmt":"2026-04-14T14:44:31","slug":"publicacoes-self-preferencing-no-contexto-das-plataformas-digitais","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/legalwings.com.br\/en\/publicacoes-self-preferencing-no-contexto-das-plataformas-digitais\/","title":{"rendered":"The Impact of Bill 2768 on Legal Certainty"},"content":{"rendered":"<div style=\"height:9px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p>Avalia os impactos regulat\u00f3rios e institucionais do Projeto de Lei n\u00ba 2.768\/2022 sobre a seguran\u00e7a jur\u00eddica no Brasil, especialmente no tocante \u00e0 veda\u00e7\u00e3o de pr\u00e1ticas de self-preferencing por plataformas digitais com \u201cpoder de controle de acesso essencial\u201d. A an\u00e1lise confronta os dispositivos do PL com a jurisprud\u00eancia do CADE nos \u00faltimos 10 anos, considerando os potenciais conflitos entre a aplica\u00e7\u00e3o ex-ante das regras propostas e o modelo ex-post adotado na an\u00e1lise concorrencial pelo CADE.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:9px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p>The main hypothesis tested is: if the bill were in force, would there be significant differences between decisions applying the text of the bill and past decisions by CADE?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:9px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p>For the methodology, emblematic cases were compared in light of four interpretative scenarios of the bill, ranging from categorical prohibition to application compatible with traditional antitrust methodology. Conviction and regulatory conflict rates were measured in each scenario.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:9px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Scenario 1 \u2013 Categorical Prohibition:<\/strong> 77% divergence from CADE case law, disregarding commercial justifications and potential consumer benefits.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:9px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Scenario 2-A \u2013 Strict Conditional Rules with Exceptions:<\/strong> A 16% divergence and rules that are more lenient than CADE's jurisprudence, including in traditional markets.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:9px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Scenario 2-B \u2013 Conditional Contribution Rules:<\/strong> 44% divergence, includes weighting of justifications, but without methodological hierarchy.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:9px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Scenario 3 \u2013 Traditional Antitrust:<\/strong> Total convergence with CADE, but with duplication of regulatory powers.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:16px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>The Fragility of the Concept of \u201cEssential Access Control Power\u201d<\/strong>: by adopting criteria similar to the gatekeeper concept, based on revenue rather than market power, which may result in disproportionate obligations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:9px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:0px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Risk of<\/strong> <strong>Conviction without Evidence of Competitive Harm:<\/strong> Conduct that CADE considered pro-competitive could be condemned under the bill, even in the absence of market power or harm to consumers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:9px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:9px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Inadequacy of Rules per se:<\/strong> CADE's experience shows that self-preferencing can bring efficiencies and improvements to consumers. There is no legal consensus or stability of precedent that justifies its ex ante prohibition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:9px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:9px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Regulatory Asymmetry and Legal Uncertainty:<\/strong> The bill creates asymmetric obligations for specific platforms without robust criteria, which compromises regulatory predictability and may discourage innovation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:9px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:9px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>High Risk of Suboptimal Decisions:<\/strong> The absence of a structured methodology (such as that used in antitrust law) can result in both over-inclusions (unjustified convictions) and under-inclusions (permitted anti-competitive conduct), undermining the effectiveness of regulation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:54px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Avalia os impactos regulat\u00f3rios e institucionais do Projeto de Lei n\u00ba 2.768\/2022 sobre a seguran\u00e7a jur\u00eddica no Brasil, especialmente no tocante \u00e0 veda\u00e7\u00e3o de pr\u00e1ticas de self-preferencing por plataformas digitais com \u201cpoder de controle de acesso essencial\u201d. A an\u00e1lise confronta os dispositivos do PL com a jurisprud\u00eancia do CADE nos \u00faltimos 10 anos, considerando os [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":430,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[29],"tags":[],"tema":[40],"tipo-de-conteudo":[35],"class_list":["post-13927","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-sem-categoria-pt","autor-josie-menezes","autor-juliano-maranhao","tema-nucleo-de-mercados-digitais","tipo-de-conteudo-relatorio"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/legalwings.com.br\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13927","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/legalwings.com.br\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/legalwings.com.br\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/legalwings.com.br\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/8"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/legalwings.com.br\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=13927"}],"version-history":[{"count":21,"href":"https:\/\/legalwings.com.br\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13927\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":16102,"href":"https:\/\/legalwings.com.br\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13927\/revisions\/16102"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/legalwings.com.br\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/430"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/legalwings.com.br\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=13927"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/legalwings.com.br\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=13927"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/legalwings.com.br\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=13927"},{"taxonomy":"tema","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/legalwings.com.br\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tema?post=13927"},{"taxonomy":"tipo-de-conteudo","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/legalwings.com.br\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tipo-de-conteudo?post=13927"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}